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The Evolution of Bank–State Ties under Economic 
Adjustment Programmes: the case of Greece 
Chrysoula Papalexatou* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the evolution of bank-state ties in Greece during the Economic 
Adjustment Programmes (EAPs). On one hand, the Greek institutional framework points 
to close “formal and informal ties” between political and banking elites, while at the same 
time the Troika’s pressure to reduce the state’s political influence in the banking 
sector was expected to be high. Indeed, from the very early stages of the crisis, even 
though the recapitalisation was realised with public funds, the Greek government’s actual 
control of the banking sector was restricted, and “formal links” between the banks and 
the state were broken. Nonetheless, little was done before 2015 in order to evaluate and 
restructure the governing bodies of the Greek banks, keeping the “informal links” intact 
during the first two EAPs. In order to explain this surprising delay, this paper advances a new 
narrative. Based on 25 in-depth elite interviews with actors involved in the 
recapitalisations, it demonstrates that preserving these “informal” bank-state ties served 
as an important crisis management tool and proved useful for safeguarding financial 
stability at the domestic but also at the EU level. Lastly, evidence suggests that beyond the 
creation of the Banking Union, it was the international actors’ lack of trust in the Greek 
government, which finally led to aggressive corporate governance reforms of Greek 
systemic banks breaking the “informal ties” between the bank and the state after the 
third recapitalisation.  
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the Hellenic Observatory of the London School of 
Economics and the Hellenic Bank association for the financial support during the 
Postdoctoral fellowship in Contemporary Greek and Cypriot Studies. 




Traditionally, states and banks have very close ties. States have been using banks in 
order to assume control over their economies but also for government debt. At the 
same time, banks have been benefiting from regulatory privileges (Epstein, 2017). 
The Eurozone debt crisis can be considered to be a turning point in the 
transformation of bank–state ties. On the one hand, as banks were about to fail and 
economic activity was about to collapse, governments around the world made 
efforts to stabilise their banking sectors with taxpayer-funded bailouts (Woll, 2014). 
On the other hand, with the creation of the European Banking Union, all Eurozone 
countries experienced intensified pressure to break their traditional models of 
domestic political influence over finance (Epstein, 2017). However, this process of 
transformation of bank–state ties is unique for each member state as, from country 
to country, the relationships banks establish with their governments are different 
(Woll, 2014). Moreover, the magnitude and nature of the crisis was also not the 
same everywhere.  
Among the Eurozone member-states that experienced the above dynamic the case 
of Greece stands apart given the extremity of the crisis. In Greece, funds for 
recapitalisations came from adjustment programmes with strong conditionality, 
while at the same time the banking sector desperately needed to shore up its 
balance sheets (Hardouvelis, 2018). At the same time, the Greek banking system was 
traditionally characterised by domestic ownership and “formal bank state ties” via 
direct state ownership or state management were present until 1990’s (Pagoulatos, 
2014). Moreover, it had a long tradition of close “informal links” between senior 
bankers, political parties and large companies (Avgouleas, 2015). Thus, the severing 
of bank–state ties was not a straightforward process.  
From the very early stages of the crisis, even though the recapitalisation was realised 
with public funds, the Greek government’s actual control of the banking sector was 
restricted, and “formal links” between the banks and the state were broken. In 
particular, while the Troika recognized the problematic nature of bank-state ties and 
despite its involvement in the recapitalisations, little was done during the first two 
EAPs to evaluate and restructure the governing bodies of the Greek banks, keeping 
the “informal links” intact. It was only in 2015 after the third recapitalisation that 
corporate governance reforms broke the “informal ties” between the bank and the 
state.  
Based on 25 in-depth interviews with actors involved in the recapitalisations, and 
through an analysis of primary and secondary sources, this paper explores how and 
why bank–state ties transformed in Greece against the backdrop of the creation of 
the Banking Union. This paper suggests that the delay in breaking the ‘‘informal 
links” between the banks and the state, was not only due to the reduced reform 
capacity of the Greek state and the protection of vested interests as is often claimed 
in the public discourse, but it was because “informal ties” between the state and the 
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banks were useful instruments for crisis management during the first stages of the 
sovereign debt crisis. Further, it is also argued that it was not only the creation of the 
Banking Union that led to the break of the “informal ties” in 2015 as the existing 
academic literature suggests, but rather it was also domestic political developments 
in Greece that led to aggressive reforms in banking sectors’ corporate governance.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature focusing on the relationship between the banks and the state in general, 
and in the Eurozone in particular. Section three presents the rationale behind the 
case selection, followed by a brief overview of the Greek banking system. After the 
presentation of the methodological approach (Section four), Section five to seven 
provide flesh to the argument. By reconstructing the negotiating positions of the 
actors involved in the recapitalisations it explains why “formal bank–state ties” were 
broken in the during the first two Economic Adjustment programs while “informal 
ties” remained intact. Section seven explains how domestic politics played a role in 
breaking the “informal bank-state ties” during the third Economic adjustment 
programme and the background behind this aggressive reform. The final section 
concludes the paper by outlining the implications for the Greek political economy 
but also for the wider academic debate concerning the symbiotic relationship 




2. Bank-State ties in the EU 
The centrality of banks to the politico-economic fortunes of states became very clear 
during the Global Financial Crisis, particularly within the Eurozone. In particular, 
Eurozone governments, along with the ECB, provided liquidity and support to 
financial institutions. By 2013, 1.6 trillion euros of state aid had been given to the 
financial system by their governments in the EU (Reuters, 2013). The so-called 
“doom-loop” is the epitome of the symbiosis between the banks and the state 
(Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012). Banks and states transfer the financial vulnerabilities 
to each other. Domestic banks often lend to national governments to maintain 
political relationships. While the borrowing costs for governments increase, banks’ 
balance sheets deteriorate since the value of the government bonds they hold 
decreases. While states risk financial failure because of high borrowing costs, banks 
also struggle. As Epstein (2017) claims, before the crisis bank–state ties were largely 
ignored. Nonetheless, “the history of European financial systems reveals the deeply 
interconnected European financial ecosystems bound by both political and financial 
relations” (Monnet et al., 2019 p.3).  
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As is often argued in the literature, the financial industry makes policy rather than 
takes policy at the expense of consumers and the general public (Woll, 2014). 
Various scholars have suggested that the benefits banks gain from national 
authorities are extensive and systematic, and this is why the term “regulatory 
capture” is so regularly used in the context of the financial industry. Simultaneously, 
banks’ political susceptibility is facilitated by bailout guarantees coming from the 
state. This implies that bank managers can take on a higher risk in order to gain 
higher returns during periods of euphoria, since the government would back them 
during crisis periods. At the same time, states can also exploit the financial system 
for their benefit, in order to overcome their own financial difficulties, or with the 
objective of directing credit to certain sectors of the economy. 
The literature documents that “formal links” such as state management or state 
ownership of the banking sector, and “informal links” such as revolving doors and 
friendships between banking and government elites entail costs linked with 
misallocation of credit and excessive holding of domestic government bonds. 
Betrand et al (2007) find that liberalisation of the French banking system in 1980’s 
eliminated intervention of the state in bank lending decisions, making the allocation 
of capital more efficient and boosting productivity. Barth et al. (2004) suggest that 
policies that empower private-sector corporate control of banks, work best to 
promote bank development, performance and stability. Moreover, informal 
networks such as revolving doors and friendships between banking and government 
elites are associated with excessive risk-taking for loans granted to entities with 
minimal creditworthiness (political parties, political firms, media). Khawa and Mian 
(2005) explore the case of Pakistan and find that firms with political connections 
borrow 45 per cent more and have 50 per cent higher default rates and preferential 
treatment occurs exclusively in government banks while private banks provide no 
political favours.  
Despite the fact that the problems of state influence in the banking sector are well 
documented in the literature, there is no doubt that it is beneficial for states to have 
access to banks that are politically influenced. There are various reasons for this: 
banks can act as creditors for states, can help in promoting growth, and they are 
useful for macroeconomic and crisis management (Verdier, 2000; Seabrooke, 2006). 
Studying the French banking bailout, Jabko and Massoc (2012) depicted an informal 
consortium’ between French state officials and top bankers, which ‘fostered organic 
solidarity in the face of a crisis’. These are the reasons that domestic financial 
interests and many national governments have been a key source of resistance of 
breaking the links between the banks and the state. However, financial crises, 
structural changes in the global economy such as intense liberalisations, and the 
social and financial pressures of international financial institutions (Epstein, 2017; 
Stein, 2010) have all been sources of transformation of bank–state ties pushing 
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towards loosening these links. The crisis period constitutes almost a natural 
experiment for Euro area member state and provides interesting insights regarding 
its implications for the relationships between governments and banks.  
According to Epstein (2017) bank–state ties were weakened in the Euro area. In the 
Eurozone, the European Banking Union (EBU) centralised bank supervision and 
introduced a single resolution board at the expense of national authority. Indeed, 
the establishment of a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) applying a single 
rulebook, was designed to limit the tendencies of national governments to favor 
domestic banks at the (Monet et al., 2014). Moreover, EBU has switched the burden 
of bank bailouts away from taxpayers and onto shareholders, bondholders and big 
depositors.  
A the same time the, ‘fit and proper’ criteria as defined by the SSM, aim also to 
uproot the linkages between the banks, politicians, and powerful vested interests, 
breaking the “informal links” that public officials maintain with financial elites. The 
importance and fluidity of these networks was recently recognised in the academic 
debate, and these studies point to the phenomenon of revolving doors and the 
friendships between senior officials and banking elites. Interestingly, the revolving 
doors phenomenon does not only mean that public officials will only grant political 
favours to former colleagues, but it also relates to the production of common 
worldviews, that develop from common experiences (Tsingou, 2008; Johnson and 
Kwak, 2010). Focusing on the Netherlands, De Haan and Veltrop (2014) suggest 
supervisors with previous tenure in the financial sector are more likely to socially 
identify with the financial sector.  
While Epstein (2017) explains how the creation of the Banking Union transformed 
bank–state ties across the euro area (EA) countries, it needs to be noted that despite 
EBU’s ambition this process remains incomplete and appears far more limited than 
originally intended. Secondly, the particular pathways to transformation were 
idiosyncratic—depending on the external constellation of power pushing for 
transformation and also on specific domestic institutional settings. Not all countries 
within the EA faced the same external pressure, nor were they similarly exposed to 
the crisis. In addition, the relationship between banks and the state is not the same 
across countries. 
In the next section, we examine how bank–state ties were transformed in Greece 
where maintaining clear boundaries between the bank and state has traditionally 
been a very difficult task. Simultaneously after the crisis, there was intensified 
pressure to weaken these ties since it was under Economic Adjustment programs 
and, thus, subject to strong conditionality. These two opposing dynamics allows us 
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to closely observe the transformation process and the political struggle underpinning 
it.  
 
3. Bank–state ties in the case of Greece 
Essentially, there are two rationales behind the case selection. First, Greece can be 
referred to as a “least likely case” for transformation: it has a bank-based financial 
system where the banking sector has traditionally been subject to political influence 
with formal and informal ties present. In bank-based systems companies and banks 
tend to be connected through a dense web of cross-shareholdings, banks to monitor 
the development of companies and allocate credit (Woll, 2014). Companies are 
dependent on bank credits and their long-term relationships with these banks have 
traditionally been central to their networks. Banks and entrepreneurs are therefore 
likely to maintain club-like personal relationships, with close connections to 
governments (Woll, 2014). 
Indeed, there is extensive informal contact between political and banking elites, and 
the majority of the Greek banking system remained state-controlled until the mid-
1990s with the government responsible for appointing the management 
(Pagoulatos, 2014). There is evidence for this period that having state-controlled 
banks resulted in a misallocation of credit (Haliassos et al., 2018). This was clear from 
the large proportion of non-performing loans held by the state-controlled banks. 
Many of these loans have been effectively directed by the government towards state 
controlled or other political firms (Haliassos et al., 2018).  
Bank privatisations began in the second half of the 1990s. Against the backdrop of 
the European single market, financial and credit liberalisation occurred. 
Liberalisation was a source of power for the banking system (Pagoulatos, 2014). 
Restrictions on lending rates were improved, exchange controls were lifted and the 
private control of the banking sector grew because of new players entering the 
market. The newly founded private banks were mostly Greek and foreign presence 
remained scarce (Haliassos et al., 2018). Furthermore, the managers of state-
controlled banks gained power after liberalisation. Despite the fact that they were 
still appointed by the government and that political pressure continued to exist, their 
bargaining power in the face of political pressures was relatively strengthened 
(Pagoulatos, 2014). As an example, banking sectors’ strength was reflected in the 
fact that it would ask for regulatory forbearance or other lucrative agreements in 
exchange for government lending. Major private banks could also negotiate with the 
state in order to obtain these beneficial agreements (Pagoulatos, 2014). 
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Over the next decade, between 1998 and 2008, Greece experienced rapid economic 
growth. While mortgage and consumer credit was low compared to other EA 
countries, total credit increased from 76.1% of GDP in 1998 to 122.8% in 2008. The 
adoption of the euro allowed governments to borrow from abroad, and as a result 
domestic bank lending to the state. However, there was an increase in loans to the 
private sector. This credit boom was beneficial for bankers, and the banking sector 
experienced an increase in its profits and incomes (Haliassos et al., 2018). The 
banking sector emerged as a powerful player but it remained subject to political 
influence. Foreign ownership remained very low and triangle deals between banks, 
businessmen and other banks or political allies (“crony banking”) continued to exist 
(Avgouleas and Papadimitriou, 2015). One potential reason for the continuous 
political influence in the banking sector is the existence of lax corporate governance 
norms which permitted Greek banks to appoint businessmen, union leaders and 
politicians to their boards (Kolliopoulos, 2021). It is reported that loans were granted 
to political parties and corporations with low creditworthiness but privileged 
relationships with the banks (EC, 2020). This overview of the banking system 
suggests that there is a tradition of close “formal and informal” links between the 
banks and the state. Therefore, one would expect that the severing of these links 
would be strongly contested.  
The second reason for choosing Greece as a case study is that the country 
experienced by far the most intensive domestic economic crisis in the EA. 
Interestingly, the Greek crisis followed the global financial crisis and was mainly fiscal 
in nature with high fiscal deficits and high public debt. At the beginning of the crisis 
in 2008–2009, Greek banks had a wide enough deposit base and were among the 
best-capitalised banks in Europe (Louri and Migiakis, 2019). They were also not 
exposed to toxic products to the same degree as other European banks. Moreover, 
banking activities in South-Eastern European countries allowed them to have 
differentiated sources of earnings. Despite their “soundness”, banks’ problematic 
lending strategies of 2000’s are now well known. Credit expansion in Greece during 
the 2000s did not efficiently allocate funding in respect of real economic growth 
(Louri and Migiakis, 2019). Despite these vulnerabilities though, the private debt-to-
GDP ratio of around 100% remained significantly lower than the EU average (150%) 
and at the beginning of the global financial crisis. In the following years, the 
deteriorating macroeconomic environment, political instability, deposit flight and 
losses on Greek government bonds (GGBs) inevitably had a disastrous impact on the 
Greek banking system. With money for the recapitalisations coming from borrowed 
European and IMF funds, the external pressure for transformation of bank state-ties 





In order to investigate how bank–state ties changed during the crisis, I focus on three 
rounds of recapitalisation of Greek banks (between 2013 and 2015). This is because 
recapitalisations would have been the exemplary moment to break the traditional 
bank ties. The reason is that recapitalisations were not an outcome of negotiations 
between only the banks and the government, because neither had the influence to 
determine unilaterally the terms of rescue packages since money was coming from 
borrowed funds. The negotiations were tripartite in nature and the main actors were 
banks, the government and the Troika. Thus, I explore how the multiple actors 
affected the bailout calculus, and how they shaped and changed the traditional links 
between the banks and the state, given that all this unfolded against the backdrop of 
the creation of the Banking Union. 
In the remainder of this paper, the term “banking sector” refers to the four systemic 
banks (Eurobank, Alpha Bank, Piraeus Bank and the National Bank of Greece). While 
each bank was acting for its own “survival” and had its own strategy, overall one can 
identify common interests when it comes to private ownership/state interference. 
The Troika is conceptualized as a single actor despite the fact that, as the following 
analysis will demonstrate, there were disagreements within it. When these 
disagreements regarding the bailouts become relevant to this analysis, they will be 
considered. Meanwhile, the term “government” refers to the governments between 
2009 and 2015. Once again, disagreements regarding state interference in the 
banking sector did exist, especially in the coalition governments, and they will be 
taken into account when necessary. Finally, the role played by domestic and 
international investors who invested at the Greek banking system that were not part 
of the negotiation process is considered because their influence was very clear on 
issues linked with state interference in the banking sector. There is also a focus on 
the Bank of Greece as the national regulator, which had a leading role in 
restructuring the banking system. 
Part of the qualitative analysis is based on an examination of policy documents, 
newspaper accounts, speeches and public statements from bankers and private 
investors, along with the publications of the systemic banks but also those of the 
Bank of Greece, the European Central Bank and EU institutions. Due to the fact that 
these issues were salient, there was also extensive media coverage.  
However, for sensitivity reasons, not everything is publicly available. Thus, and to put 
the primary documents into perspective, I have conducted 25 interviews with senior 
members of the Greek governments and banking sector, officials from the Troika and 
the Bank of Greece, international investors, lawmakers and other key players 
involved in the three recapitalisations. A number of the public officials I interviewed 
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have left the positions they held at the time, but they still hold different positions, 
which means that they tend to be concerned about the publicity that might arise 
from information they provide to scholars. Thus, the interviews were conducted on 
the basis of in-depth background, with complete confidentiality assured to 
encourage openness. The interviews followed a semi-structured style and my list of 
questions changed depending on the profile of the interviewee. On the majority of 
occasions, the interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis, but I also had 
group discussions in order to gain multiple perspectives on the same topic 
depending on the different expertise of the participants. Interviews are subject to 
certain limitations and biases. Hence, the qualitative analysis builds on the 
combination of accounts from interviews, primary sources and secondary literature, 
which are all used to triangulate the information given in any one of the individual 
sources. Further details about the interviews can be found in the annex. 
 
 
5. The first two recapitalisations: The break of “formal” banks 
state-ties and the maintenance of “informal-ties” 
In the next section, the transformation of banks state ties during the first and the 
second Economic adjustment programmes is presented. More precisely, the analysis 
that follows demonstrates that the ‘‘formal links” between the banks and the state 
were significantly weakened, but the “informal links” remained intact. To begin, the 
sovereign debt crisis hit the Greek banking system very hard. Private sector 
involvement (PSI) massively reduced the value of Greek government bonds that 
banks were holding in their portfolios.  
The primary aim of the recapitalisation and resolution plan that followed was to 
restore the capital base of the four systemic banks and resolve all other non-
systemically important banks that were unable to recapitalise themselves through 
private capital (ECA, 2017). The first bank recapitalisation mainly utilised borrowed 
European and IMF funds, which came from the Economic Adjustment Programme 
2012–2014. The recapitalisation was supervised by the Hellenic Financial Stability 
Fund (HFSF), a newly established institution that was under the control of the Greek 
state and its creditors. It was decided that four banks (Eurobank, Alpha Bank, Piraeus 
Bank and the National Bank of Greece) were systemic and would be recapitalised 
using public funds (Hardouvelis, 2018). The agreed procedure was that the state and 
private investors would buy shares, but free warrants would be given only to private 
investors for each share they purchased. The warrants were a sweetener to 
encourage private investors to become involved in the recapitalisation (EC, 2020). It 
became clear that the introduction of warrants allowed private investors to enter 
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the recapitalisation process on better terms than the state. Moreover, the creditors 
placed strict limitations on the HFSF and its voting rights so it would only receive “B 
Shares” with suspended voting rights (EC, 2020). This procedure was in line with the 
strategy of increasing business autonomy and ensuring that the banking sector 
would not be managed by the Greek state. Only when a bank could not raise the 
required 10% would the HFSF have full voting rights. This happened only in the case 
of Eurobank which became fully controlled by the state (EC, 2020). The remaining 
three systemic banks managed to raise more than the required 10% (Alpha 12%, 
NBG 11.1% and Piraeus 19.7%) (Haliassos, 2018). The total amount of public funds 
used was €25.5 billion (€4 billion for Alpha, €5.8 billion for Eurobank, €8.7 billion for 
NBG and €7 billion for Piraeus). The remaining banks were recapitalised with private 
funds or resolved, recapitalised and then transferred to the four large banks. This 
process was completed by July 2013 (ECA, 2017). 
In 2014, the four banks proceeded to a second round of recapitalisation after a 
follow-up stress test conducted by the Bank of Greece in cooperation with Blackrock. 
A second recapitalisation was necessary due to the projected increased losses on the 
private sector loans due to the economic crisis (Hardouvelis, 2018). The economic 
atmosphere was very different in comparison to the first recapitalisation. By 2014, 
there were positive growth projections and the dependence of banks on expensive 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) funding from their central bank was back to 
zero. In this more positive climate, no public funds were used for this second 
recapitalisation. More particularly, €8.3 billion was raised entirely through the 
private sector (ECA, 2017). It is worth noting that the conditions in the second 
programme (and third programme) allowed the HFSF to be used only as a last-resort 
source of support in the recapitalisation of 2014. This meant that it could not 
participate in the bank recapitalisations in case there was private sector interest. The 
objective was to minimise further injections of public funds and further public 
control. With banks raising only private capital, the HFSF’s participation was 
significantly diluted. 
The first recapitalisation resulted in a highly concentrated banking system (the five 
largest banks in Greece held 94% of the banking system’s assets) in which business 
autonomy was ensured as the HFSF held shares with suspended voting rights, 
despite the enormous amount of public funds (€38.9 billion) that were used for 
recapitalisation and resolutions. The second recapitalisation resulted in significant 
dilution of the HFSF’s shares in the banking sector, minimising further public control. 
Thus, it is clear that effort had been exerted after the first EAP to minimise state 
involvement in the banking sector and break the “formal” bank state ties.  
This rationale is easily explained as the costs of state control of the banking system 
are well documented in the literature. For example, La Porta et al. (2002) highlight 
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how in countries where state ownership of banks is more extensive, lending 
decisions are poor, and productivity and GDP grow more slowly. Moreover, the 
Greek crisis is unique. In other Eurozone countries, the banks’ problems spilled over 
to the states. In the case of Greece, the opposite happened as the problems of the 
sovereign spilled over to the banking sector (Louri and Migiakis, 2019). Between 
2009 and 2012, banks lost almost 40% of their deposits, mainly to banks abroad. 
Simultaneously, with weaknesses in interbank lending, the Greek public debt crisis 
stimulated a series of intentional rating downgrades (Louri and Migiakis, 2019). This 
peculiarity in the Greek case is reflected in the credit rating downgrades: due to the 
Greek banks’ good fundamentals, their ratings were higher compared to the Greek 
state between 2010 and 2013. This demonstrates in the early phase of the Greek 
crisis that these rating downgrades were mostly the result of the negative outlook on 
the state’s fiscal sustainability risk rather than worsening bank-specific or sector-
specific factors (Louri and Migiakis, 2019).  
The fact that the Greek crisis was mainly fiscal in nature justifies the position of the 
actors involved in the negotiations regarding the banks’ business autonomy. More 
precisely, the Troika clearly wanted to avoid state control of the banking sector. 
According to IMF Country Report No. 11/351:  
For the core of the banking system, public recap support will likely prove necessary, 
but can be implemented while preserving private management and some private 
control. Concerning full public recap, the government of Greece has a poor track 
record of properly managing state-owned banks and managing its own finances. This 
suggests that an effort needs to be made to keep a part of the core banking system in 
private hands, run by competent managers (IMF, 2011). 
At the same time, the interests of Greek banks collided with the interests of the 
Troika. According to Culpepper and Reinke (2014), banks first choice is generally to 
raise private money to avoid the government being a shareholder. In the case of 
Greece where the crisis was perceived as fiscal, and especially because economic 
recovery was expected, they wanted to preserve the business autonomy they had 
gained in the 1990s.2In particular, they did not want to return to government control 
and state intervention, as this would discourage the participation of private investors 
in the recapitalisations.3 
The position of the Greek state was more complex. Initially, the socialist PASOK party 
under George Papandreou supported public funds being injected into banks but the 
HFSF would receive common stocks with voting rights (To Vima, 2012). When 
Papandreou formally resigned as Prime Minister of Greece in 2011, he was 
 
2 Interview 25, Interview 10 
3 Interview 8, Interview 5, Interview 10 
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succeeded by a coalition government comprised of PASOK (socialist party), New 
Democracy (conservative party) and LAOS (right-wing party) with former ECB vice 
president Lucas Papademos as Prime Minister. Kolliopoulos (2020a) argues that it 
was not only the pressure coming from the Troika that made the idea of common 
shares with full voting rights unfeasible (full voting rights would mean that the state 
would have control over the banking sector) but it was also the heterogeneity of 
views regarding this issue within the coalition government that played a role. The 
government was provisional and signed the second adjustment programme and also 
the PSI (Hardouvelis, 2018). It did not have the political support to implement the 
recapitalisation, as this issue was highly salient4. However, Papademos seemed to 
share the views of the international lenders and was openly in favour of banks’ 
private management (Vima, 2012).  
Nonetheless, one may argue that statements in favour of shares with full voting 
rights could also serve as “signalling politics”. According to a public opinion poll from 
2008, only 11% of Greeks wanted banks to be supported with taxpayer money 
(Pagoulatos, 2014). Thus, injecting money into the banks would be politically 
unpopular. Moreover, as Venizelos (Finance Minister at the time) stated in: “The 
negotiations with the troika are very hard regarding the issue of recapitalisation” 
(Kathimerini, 2012). With the Troika having a very clear policy regarding public 
management of the banking sector, it comes as a surprise that Greek politicians did 
not know that achieving a deal with full voting rights was out of reach. Moreover, 
state’s involvement would discourage private investors, if private investors were not 
attracted, recapitalisation would be even more costly during a period when the 
economic environment was deteriorating. 
To conclude, the first and second programmes had an impact on bank–state ties. 
While banks were rescued with public funds, business autonomy was the priority. 
“Formal links”, regarding state bank ownership and state management, were 
weakened either by encouraging the private investors to participate or by placing 
strict limitations on the voting rights associated with the HFSF’s possession of shares 
in the banks (EC, 2010). What is surprising is that the programme itself did not 
include conditions to enhance bank governance and break “informal bank state ties”. 
While the recapitalisations occurred mainly through the HFSF, sufficient scrutiny of 
their private management of banks was not ensured. In contrast to other country 
cases, while public funds were used for the recapitalisations, HFSF was not entitled 
to assess the members of banks’ boards regarding their experience and 
independence (ECA, 2017). 
 
4 Interview 5 
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Some economists attribute this reform postponement to the fact that the 
programmes had other priorities due to the severe fiscal problems that the country 
was facing.5 Hence, the focus of the first programme was mainly on the immediate 
and critical fiscal policies, while the banking sector was considered relatively sound 
at the time (EC, 2020). Nonetheless, despite the fact that banks suffered mainly due 
to the solvency channel, there were underlying vulnerabilities (Haliassos et al., 
2018). Credit expansion in Greece during the 2000s mainly involved consumer loans 
and loans to households (Louri and Migiakis, 2019). Greek banks had become 
increasingly dependent on interbank loans in the latter stage of the credit boom. 
This is why the Greek banks received 28 billion euro in 2008 from the Greek state. 
Initially, the banks appeared unwilling to accept the terms and requirements New 
Democracy government’s “financial crisis reaction plan”, which they claimed would 
limit their autonomy regarding management and banking policies. This reluctance, 
however, served a specific purpose: by insisting that they did not need the plan, the 
banks were attempting to avoid the emergence of concerns about their robustness 
and capital adequacy (Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos, 2009). Nonetheless, behind 
closed doors these considerations were cast aside given the banks’ actual capital 
needs6. Moreover, there were also “governance-related problems (e.g., banks 
lending to related parties on non-market terms) that existed well before the crisis, as 
Greek banks’ corporate governance was, on average, considerably inferior to that of 
their European counterparts from the outset” (ECA, 2017). Given the vulnerabilities 
of the Greek banking system and crony banking and the high levels of NPLs (31.9% in 
2013) it is surprising that bank management was not replaced and continued as 
normal. As a result, “informal bank–state ties” were not weakened as they would 
have been if a stringent fit and proper test for board members was implemented in 
the first two EAPs. 
There is extensive and flourishing literature after the crisis on the low reform 
capacity of the Greek state. Kolliopoulos (2020b) suggests that the inertia of the 
authorities and the bankers resulted in full foreign-ownership and control of the 
banking system in the third EAP, something he calls “de-hellenization”. Avgouleas 
(2015) explains that in contrast to international practices, recapitalisation in Greece 
benefited the banking sector that received considerable amounts of state aid and 
ended up being highly concentrated. Yet, as discussed above, international lenders 
had a substantial say in the design of the recapitalisation policies. Thus, it seems that 
attributing the post-rescue approach and the delay in corporate governance reforms 
purely to the low reform capacity of the Greek state, and the protection of vested 
interests, does not paint the full picture.  
 
5 Interview 4, Interview 18 
6 Interview 1 
14 
 
6. Bank-state ties as a crisis management tool 
The following section explains that “informal bank–state ties” remained intact in the 
first stages of the crisis because they served as a crisis management tool, and this 
was recognised by all actors involved in the recapitalisations. In the period when 
financial stability was threatened and banking activity was on the verge of collapse, 
the banks and state were holding each other’s hands tightly in order to minimise 
systemic risk.7 This is not a unique phenomenon for the Greek case. As an example, 
Massoc and Jacob (2012) have demonstrated that Sarkozy in France relied on close 
informal ties between the state and the banks to handle smoothly the banking crisis. 
What makes the Greek case of particular interest is, that paradoxically enough, 
keeping these links intact in the first phase of the sovereign debt crisis was also in 
line the interest of international lenders. These links helped to reduce systemic risk 
and risk of contagion at the EU level, reduced the cost of the recapitalisation, and 
helped to avoid full nationalisation of the banking sector in the long run, which 
would have been problematic for the ECB (Musevar, 2016). More particularly, there 
were at least three ways that the delay in corporate governance reforms and the 
maintenance of “informal bank–state ties” served as a crisis management tool 
during the sovereign debt crisis: the purchase of Greek government bonds before 
the PSI, the raising of 10% of private capital in the first recapitalisation which helped 
to preserve business autonomy, and the resolution process. 
First, the crisis was triggered when the newly elected government of Papandreou in 
October 2009 revealed that the budget deficit would be around 12.5, twice as much 
as was previously reported. In May 2010, Greece was the first country to lose access 
to capital markets. There is an extensive argument among economists about 
whether Greece’s debt could have been restructured sooner and how 2010 would 
have been an ideal time. However, it is questionable whether this would have been 
politically feasible given the impact on banks’ balance sheets in core countries, 
notably France and Germany (Xafa, 2014). According to the IMF (2013), the 
programme served as a “holding operation” that allowed private creditors to reduce 
exposures. 
The exposure of core euro area banks, especially French and German banks, was a 
key reason for delaying the PSI, because there was the fear that their losses would 
have significant implications for systemic instability (Xafa, 2014). In contrast to 
foreign banks, Greek banks did not benefit from the opportunity presented by the 
ECB Security Market Programme (SMP) to offload the GGBs prior to the PSI. This was 
a sovereign bond buying operation launched by the ECB on 9 May 2010 and 
maintained until September 2012 (EC, 2020). In essence, exposure of Greek banks 
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was on the rise from mid-2009, while that of foreign banks was declining (EC, 2010). 
The exposure of Greek banks to GGBs in December 2011 was 9.4% of the total 
banking assets, almost 70% higher than in May 2008. While there was a similar trend 
of domestic banks increasing their portfolio of government bonds during the initial 
stages of the crisis in other programme countries as well (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 
2012), Greek banks were holding a much greater proportion of domestic 
government debt compared to the rest of the Eurozone countries. Bank for 
International Settlements data on cross-country bond holdings suggests that foreign 
banks held €25 billion of Greek Government Bonds at the end of June 2011 when the 
PSI was being negotiated, Greek banks €60 billion and the ECB €50 billion (Xafa, 
2014).  
As a consequence, Greek banks suffered the largest losses in the PSI. In principle, 
they could have avoided default by holding fewer GGBs. Besides deriving profits on 
spreads, profit-oriented banks have no commercial interest in keeping Greek bonds. 
Evidence suggests that government pressure must have played a role. One reason 
for this is that in general the banking sector’s survival also depends on the 
sovereign’s survival, meaning that in times of crisis the banks and state are strongly 
united in their desire to avoid an economic collapse.8 Moreover, banks that had 
strong ties with the government were pressured to buy government bonds and this 
pressure was stronger during the crisis when the government had difficulty 
refinancing itself.9 The authorities were concerned about the potential rise in 
spreads on GGBs in the case of a sell-off by Greek banks, and therefore they 
encouraged them not to go ahead. This is evident as the domestic exposure was 
indeed greater for state-controlled banks than for those controlled privately (EC, 
2020). Holdings for GGBs and other loans to the Greek state were 303% of capital for 
the aggregate of state-controlled banks and 171% for the aggregate of privately 
controlled banks (Haliassos et al., 2018). Hence, it can be easily demonstrated that 
the long-term relationship between the banks and the state was of particular help in 
that moment that Greek state that had no other alternative way of financing itself. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the banks complied with their 
government’s request because they trusted they would be repaid some day in the 
future. This is explained by the uneven distribution of losses in the restructuring. 
Whereas pension funds and other domestic bondholders suffered losses of around 
65% of the present value of their claims, only the banks were compensated in full 
through the mechanism of bank recapitalisation (Musevar, 2016).  
As described above, all recapitalisations and resolutions under the three EAPs aimed 
to maximise the involvement of private investors and minimise the state’s control of 
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the banking sector (EC, 2020). This approach stemmed from a general mistrust of the 
state’s capacities, given the government’s mismanagement of the economy prior to 
the crisis. This is why in the first recapitalisation was that if private investors could 
buy at least 10% of the shares in a bank, then they could exert full control, despite 
the state (via the HFSF) holding the majority of the shares. It is very important to 
underline that under the first recapitalisation banks had negative equity. This is why 
the design of the first recapitalisation was extremely challenging due to the fact that 
finding 10% would be critical in a period when private investors had only limited 
appetite for investing in Greek banks.  
This was the second way by which personal contacts and the maintenance of old 
management was an important crisis management tool. According to interviews, 
foreign investors expressed only limited interest in Greek banks.10 Thus, with foreign 
investors shying away and domestic investors having limited capacity, finding this 
10% was a very challenging task.11 Characteristically, bank managers exerted huge 
efforts; telephone calls and personal visits to clients and Greek businessmen were 
taking place on a daily basis. This was a period when mutual trust and the long-term 
personal relationships between banking and business elites were of major 
importance. Therefore, replacing the management at that time, or after the 
recapitalisation, would have almost certainly created problems in terms of raising 
the required private capital. If the managers knew that they would be replaced, they 
would not have the incentive to utilise their networks. Moreover, their knowledge of 
the structure of the Greek economy their links with business elites were also very 
useful during this period.12 
According to a European Commission report (2020), based on interviews with 
representatives of three institutions who were directly involved in the process, the 
goal of maximising the involvement of private shareholders was driven by the fact 
that the institutions had anticipated that more stress tests would be needed, with 
the possibility of further recapitalisations. Limiting state involvement was therefore a 
way of preserving state funds. According to the IMF (2013b) the private sector’s 
participation in the first recapitalisation was stronger than envisaged. The existing 
banking elites seemed to have played a decisive role in finding and attracting private 
investors. Had this not been the case, the state’s financial injections could have been 
greater, increasing the final bill and complicating subsequent privatisation. 
Paradoxically, the bank managers’ efforts to raise the 10% to avoid state 
intervention was in line with the interests of international lenders but also of the 
Greek state that was struggling to keep the final bill to a minimum. 
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The final and very important way that bank–state ties served as a crisis management 
tool and helped safeguard financial stability concerns the process of resolutions. The 
Ministry of Finance, in cooperation with the Bank of Greece, set up the institutional 
framework (Laws 4021/2011 and 4051/2012) for the resolution of credit institutions. 
In all these cases, the resolved credit institutions were considered non-viable and 
concurrently not systemically important. The public funds used for these banks 
amounted to €13.4 billion. The forms of resolution that were selected were either 
the establishment of a transitional credit institution (Proton, Hellenic Postbank) or 
the transfer of assets (or part of the assets) to another credit institution (T-Bank, the 
Agricultural Bank of Greece, FBB, Probank and the other cooperative banks). The 
process of resolution for credit institutions was accompanied by a series of takeovers 
and transfers, including branches of Cypriot banks. The resolutions completely 
altered the banking landscape (Triantopoulos, 2014). The total number of credit 
institutions in Greece in 2013 was limited to 41 (from 66 in 2000). The ratio of the 
share of the five largest banks in the whole banking system amounted to 97% in 
2013 from 70% in 2008, while in the EA the same ratio was kept to just below 50% 
(Triantopoulos, 2014).  
The main priority for the Bank of Greece was to safeguard financial stability and 
protects deposits in the entire domestic banking system. In the economic 
environment of the time, withdrawing the authorisation of even a small bank 
entailed a systemic risk (Bank of Greece, 2014). It is important to underline that 
between February 2010 and June 2012, the Bank of Greece had to deal with 
successive incidents of sizeable cash outflows. According to the breakdown of 
demand on a weekly basis, 11 weeks with cash outflows of over €1 billion were 
recorded. Characteristically, on 14 June 2012 the Cash Processing and Distribution 
Centre in Halandri served 76 cash-carrier vehicles for the delivery of cash to credit 
institutions, against a daily average of 20 vehicles for cash dispatches and receipts 
(BoG, 2014). Considering the timing of resolutions when the bail-in and the bank 
holiday in the Cypriot banking system took place (first semester of 2013), such 
dangers were highly elevated (Bank of Greece, 2014). 
In these adverse circumstances, entry by foreign banks was very difficult to achieve 
due to the high sovereign risk and economic uncertainty. Thus, with limited entry by 
foreign banks, it was the systemic four banks that absorbed the resolved institutions. 
Meanwhile, the idea was that resolutions would help the systemic banks obtain 
satisfactory capital adequacy, improve their liquidity margins and enhance their 
efficiency through the achievement of synergies and economies of scale. It is 
unquestionable that the four systemic credit institutions significantly expanded in 
size. The share was as follows: Piraeus Bank had a 26% share (from 11% in 2008), the 
National Bank of Greece had a 24% share (from 18% in 2008), EFG Eurobank had 
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23% (from 20% in 2008) and Alpha Bank had 19% (from 14% in 2008) (Triantopoulos, 
2014).  
While the high concentration of the banking system is what is mainly discussed with 
reference to the recapitalisation process, it is very important to understand that if 
any of these banks collapsed, it could have potentially lead to a bank run.13 
Moreover, finding a potential buyer for the good parts of the non-systemic 
institutions was a difficult task because the remaining banks’ loan books were of 
ambiguous quality,14 given that as the recession deepened they were expecting 
more of their loans to become non-performing.  
Banking elites were particularly helpful during this crucial period of the resolution 
process, sometimes absorbing banks literally overnight, preventing deposit outflows 
and decreasing the financial stability risks.15 In order to demonstrate how “the banks 
and state once again held each other’s hands”, we focus on the Cypriot bank 
branches in Greece where the risk of contagion was extremely high, and also the 
case of ATEbank that suffered from chronic structural problems. Both were absorbed 
by Piraeus, which was the bank that increased its share more than any of the other 
four institutions. In both cases, it was not easy to find a prospective acquirer in a 
short time frame. 
The second reason for focusing on these particular cases relates to the profile of the 
bank’s chairman, Mr. Michalis Sallas, as articles in the international press have often 
associated his name with “crony banking”.16 According to an article published by The 
New York Times (2013): “Mr. Sallas has pushed the boundaries of proper banking too 
far and […] his manoeuvring in the murky world of Greek finance, where the interests 
of bankers, the media and politicians often commingle, should be more closely 
scrutinised.” On the other hand, Sallas’s supporters say that he claimed “he should 
be hailed for his entrepreneurial expertise and robust appetite for risk” (FT, 2018). 
There is no doubt that Sallas had been actively involved in politics. In 1974, he was a 
founding member of PASOK, Papandreou’s party. In successive Papandreou 
governments, he served as General Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce, 
Governor of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, economic advisor to the 
Prime Minister and chairman of the committee for the modernisation of the Greek 
banking system, among other positions. At the same time, Piraeus, under the 
management of Sallas, had been adopting quite an aggressive strategy regarding 
mergers and acquisitions. Besides the state-owned Agricultural Bank and Cypriot 
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banks in Greece, Piraeus also took over operations of France’s Societe General and 
Millennium BCP and the Greek assets of Laiki and the Bank of Cyprus.  
Some commentators suggest that given the lack of entry and competition, it is 
possible that the large banks earned rent by absorbing the remaining banks at a 
price below their true value (Haliassos et al., 2018). Nonetheless, with the benefit of 
hindsight one can argue that the rents could not be too large as otherwise the banks 
would have been able to attract more private capital in June 2013 (Haliassos et al., 
2018). Finding a timely acquirer of ATEbank and Cypriot branches when investment 
appetite was so low was critical for the Greek government and for safeguarding 
financial stability.17 This was recognised by the Bank of Greece, the Greek 
government and the four systemic banks.18 
As a result of its close entanglement with the state, ATEbank’s assets were of poor 
quality. Proof of its major weaknesses was the fact that it ranked last among 91 large 
banks in the EU-wide stress-testing exercise conducted by the European Banking 
Authority in 2011. Following the PSI, capital adequacy ratio decreased by 26% at the 
end of 2011 and the bank’s own funds turned out to be negative (-€3 billion) (BoG, 
2014). Indeed, in view of all these weaknesses and the bank’s long-standing poor 
performance, some representatives of the troika were of the opinion that ATEbank 
should be closed (BoG, 2014). However, closing it would add thousands to the 
unemployment roll. Over €20 billion would be needed for the compensation of 
depositors and the return of the euro system’s financing (BoG, 2014). Thus, only two 
options remained: either transfer the bank’s sound part to another credit institution, 
if a prospective acquirer could be found, or re-establish the bank as an interim credit 
institution and sell it within a short time frame. As for the path taken, in early May 
2012 the Bank of Greece invited the four largest Greek banks (the National Bank of 
Greece, Alpha Bank, Eurobank and Piraeus Bank), which were considered to be 
systemically important and were recapitalised by the HFSF, to consider acquiring 
ATEbank’s sound assets and liabilities. The Bank assigned two international 
investment banks to explore any interest from foreign investors (BoG, 2014).  
These investment banks informed the Bank of Greece that no such interest had been 
expressed from abroad. Piraeus was the only bank to submit a binding proposal; the 
price quoted in its bid was €95 million, which would accrue to the “bad bank” (Bank 
of Greece, 2014). While it is extremely difficult to assess the counterfactual scenario, 
it has been stated many times that the view of the Bank of Greece and the Greek 
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government was that if ATEbank closed, it would be a threat to systemic stability and 
incur costs for the taxpayers.19 
As a result of the resolution options for unsustainable credit institutions, the main 
objectives of BoG were the protection of depositors, the retaining of employment in 
credit institutions and the assurance of systemic stability.20 According to one former 
cabinet member, in this sense: “Sallas21 was very helpful at a critical time for the 
government. If those banks had gone under in Greece, it could have sparked a 
disastrous bank run” (Financial Times, 2015).  
This was even more obvious in the case of Cypriot banks. The Eurogroup’s decision 
on Cyprus in March 2013 was the most important threat to financial stability in 
Greece at the time. It was necessary to ensure the smooth transfer of the assets and 
liabilities of the Cypriot banks to Piraeus via a tendering process. This task was 
extremely complicated, and it needed to be done in short time in order to ensure 
that deposits with Greek branches of Cypriot banks would be excluded from the bail-
in and that the Cypriot branches would continue to serve their clients efficiently 
(BoG,2014). This was necessary in order to minimise the risk of contagion to the 
Greek banking system.22 In an interview at Fortune on 9/3/2020, when asked about 
the most critical moment of his career, Mr. Sallas answered: “The most critical day 
was the 26 March 2013 when the board of directors decided to absorb the Cypriot 
branches. We understood that if we didn’t intervene there, the country wouldn’t be 
able to avoid default, and the banks would be closed.” 
In interviews conducted with senior members of the central bank, senior members 
of the government and banking elites, there was a common understanding that close 
cooperation between banking elites was necessary to safeguard financial stability.  
While, it has been often discussed that Piraeus’s strategy at the time was to become 
“too big to fail”23, there is no doubt that the acquisition of Cypriot banks by Piraeus 
was very important for “saving” banking activity. The sovereign’s fate was linked 
with the fate of banks and close links helped to act sometimes “overnight” despite 
the importance of the decisions taken.  
“Informal bank–state ties” served as a crisis management instrument and helped to 
avoid extraordinary losses for the state, ensured financial stability and the 
sovereign’s fiscal and debt position. It needs to be underlined, that this analysis does 
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not imply that the absence of bank state ties cannot also help in crisis times. In 
Eastern Europe the high level of foreign ownership made it possible for the Eastern 
markets to rely on foreign banks’ willingness to maintain their credit exposure during 
the crisis. Instead of cutting and running during the crisis, Epstein argues (2017) that 
foreign banks worked together with the European Bank for Restructuring and 
Development and the International Monetary Fund to maintain their presence and 
their market share, and, more importantly, the stability of Eastern markets.  
 
7.  The third recapitalisation: The break of “informal” bank–
state ties  
Bank–state ties were transformed completely after the third recapitalisation. The 
third programme provided stricter selection criteria with regard to the qualification 
and experience of banks’ board members. However, these criteria were stricter 
compared to international standards, restricted the candidates to banking and 
financial expertise. In January 2015, the left-wing party Syriza and the right-wing 
party ANEL formed the government and both opposed the provisions of a bailout 
plan. The Syriza-led government’s long negotiations with the Troika and the 
announcement of a referendum regarding the new bailout agreement intensified 
deposit flight and Grexit fears returned. Moreover, the ECB did not increase the loan 
limit.  
In these circumstances, banks were again in extensive need of capital, given the six-
month run-on deposits, the imposition of capital controls and the large number of 
non-performing loans. The SSM decided to conduct a new Asset Quality Review 
(AQR) and perform new stress tests on the four systemic banks despite the fact that 
a similar exercise had been conducted one year earlier on all large European banks. 
While banks were not required to raise new capital as a result of the previous AQR, 
after this AQR they had to acknowledge an additional combined capital loss of €9.6 
billion. They were required to raise €13.7 billion. Alpha bank and Eurobank managed 
to raise their required capital needs from the private market (ECA, 2017) and HFSF’s 
participations decreased from 66,2% to 11%, and from 35,4% to 2,3% respectively. 
HFSF became the major shareholder with full voting rights in the National Bank of 
Greece and Piraeus Bank.  
However, this did not mean that state would have an influence in the banking sector.  
After the third recapitalisation, significant changes were applied with the third 
Economic Adjustment Programme regarding corporate governance in the banking 
sector. Firstly, the government’s say in the HFSF was reduced. According to Law No. 
4340/2015, which was based on the provisions of the MoU between the ESM and 
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Greece, a new procedure for the selection of members of both the Executive Board 
and the General Council was added to the HFSF law. More specifically, a selection 
panel was established, comprising six members, three of whom were appointed by 
the EU institutions (including the Chair, who held the deciding vote in split votes), 
two by the Ministry of Finance and one by the Bank of Greece. Thus, with the third 
EAP, Eurozone representatives gained most of the decision-making power.24 
Moreover, the creation of the EBU had already enhanced bank’s governance and 
weakened bank state ties. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) had to approve 
the banks’ senior appointments, now regulated the four large banks. Within the 
SSM, the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs) jointly assess the “fit 
and proper” of new board members against five criteria: experience, reputation, 
conflicts of interest and independence of mind, time commitment, and collective 
suitability. However, when applying these criteria, the ECB’s Banking Supervision 
adopted a case-by-case approach, taking account of the specificities of national law. 
According to a provision of the MoU between the ESM and Greece in August 2015, 
the HFSF would introduce a process to review the board and committee members of 
the four systemic banks, with the help of an independent international consultant. 
Law No.4340/2015 (and its amendment No.4346/2015) established the following 
reviewing criteria for the members of boards of directors: They must have at least 
ten years of senior management experience in the areas of banking, auditing, or risk 
management, which should include, especially for non-executive members, a past 
tenure of at least three years as a member of a board of directors at an international 
financial institution. Moreover, individuals who had served in senior civil servant, 
public corporation or partisan positions over the previous four years were excluded 
from board membership. Independent, non-executive experts should have fifteen 
years’ international banking experience and at least three years’ experience as a 
board member or in a senior managerial position (which should have been acquired 
in institutions not operating in the Greek credit market). In addition, at least one 
member should have expertise and at least five years’ international experience in 
risk management and distressed asset management (ECA, 2020). 
HFSF conducted a tendering process according to which Spencer Stuart was selected 
as the preferred consulting firm for the evaluation procedure. By the end of 2016, 
44% of the total board headcount and 58% of all non-executive directors were 
replaced (HFSF, 2017). It is clear that this reform was aiming to replace management 
teams in order to break the linkages between banks, politicians and business elites.25 
The objective was to ensure complete independence of banks that were 
recapitalised by the Greek government but also to stop poor lending practices. 
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Additionally, the requirement for three independent international experts with no 
affiliation to any Greek credit institution over the previous ten years is indicative of 
the intention to remove part of the long-term management of the banks. According 
to surveys conducted by the European Commission (2020) there was a widespread 
view, that weak corporate governance and loose credit conditions played a role in 
contributing to the build-up of NPLs. The NPL ratio rose from 4.6% in 2007 to 9.1% in 
2010 and to 31.9% in 2013 before surging to 47.5% in 2016 (Siokis,2019).  
While many representatives of the banking sector thought that the reforms were 
proceeding in the right direction, these criteria have been characterised as being 
overly strict (ECA, 2017; Katseli, 2020). The reason for this is that the criteria 
restricted the candidates to banking and financial expertise.26 Also entrepreneurs 
with deep knowledge of the structure of the Greek economy were excluded.27 It has 
been suggested that this requirement was not fully aligned with international 
practices and EU/SSM requirements, which, in principle, promote board diversity 
and collective knowledge (Katseli, 2020). More specifically, as stated in Article One 
paragraph 1 of the EU DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EE (CRD, IV),  
“Members of the management body shall at all times be of sufficiently good repute 
and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The 
overall composition of the management body shall reflect an adequately broad range 
of experiences.”   
Given the uniqueness of the Greek case, and how aggressive the changes were, 
attributing the weakening of informal bank–state ties purely to the creation of the 
EBU is rather misleading. One should also explore other simultaneous political 
developments. The background behind the decisions regarding the criteria is not 
publicly available (Katseli, 2020). According to Katseli (2020), who was Chair of the 
Board of Directors of the National Bank of Greece and Hellenic Bank Assocation, 
changes in corporate governance were strongly pushed by the Troika. The IMF 
(2017) had expressed its views about a stringent fit and proper test for board 
members multiple times.  
“Post-2013, imposition of a stringent fit and proper standard for board members and 
management, and other strict governance rules immediately after the PSI, might 
have accelerated the improvement in banks’ governance, avoiding the need to police 
problems on a case-by-case basis (IMF, 2017)”.  
Hence the question remains why they were only implemented under the third EAP. 
According to Katseli (2017) some claim that if Syriza was not in power, these 
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measures would never have been implemented. The election of a left-wing Syriza-led 
coalition government and the fear of interference in the banking sector seem to 
have played a pivotal role in completely transforming the bank–state ties. In 
interviews conducted with government officials, it is clear that there was a 
widespread fear that, under Syriza, banks would be susceptible to political 
interference.28 These views are also confirmed by Troika officials and by articles in 
the international press.29 Characteristically, a Wall Street Journal (2014) article 
describes how threats from members of Syriza to nationalise bank “spooked some 
investors”. Indeed, the election of Syriza triggered a fresh wave of Grexit fears and 
deposit runs as the government came to power with anti-austerity rhetoric. This 
political uncertainty combined with fears of political interference in the banking 
sector would be something that would discourage private investors’ participation.30  
Private sector’s participation in the third recapitalisation was crucial. There is an 
extensive discussion about how the state, the Troika and also the banks were in 
favour of raising private capital and speeding up the bank recapitalisation process in 
order to avoid triggering new “burden-sharing” rules that came into effect on 
January 1, 2016. Bank share prices, sunk to new low ahead of the November 
offering. The idea to impose a haircut on unsecured deposits in excess of 100.000 
Euro, would also Greek corporations and this have further affected negatively 
economic activity.31 Asking all four systemic banks to raise funds at the same time in 
a risky market environment before the government had shown a dedication to the 
programme appeared to be difficult to achieve.32 In this political turmoil, corporate 
governance needed to be enhanced as well.  The implementation of strict measures 
was necessary to limit the state’s interference in the financial sector. According to 
the Wall Street Journal (2016), “European Regulators argue that boards must be 
gutted if the banks are to attract foreign capital to clean up their balance sheets”.  
In 2015, it is quite remarkable that despite the losses, many of the private investors 
decided to participate in the new offering. Many argue that private investors, would 
not be inclined to participate in the new offering if they had not acquired control of 
the banks at fire-sale prices (Xafa, 2016). Another potential reason that explains why 
investors were still eager to invest is that the ones that had invested previously (2nd 
recapitalisation), they want to avoid making it a failed investment, thereby giving the 
Greek banking systems another opportunity.33 Moreover, there was a consensus 
that the need for recapitalisation had nothing to do with the banks themselves as 
they were found to have sufficient capital in the comprehensive assessment that was 
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conducted before the ECB took over the supervision of the EA banks in November 
2014. In the end, foreign private funds participation was of major importance in the 
third recapitalization Foreign investors’ presence increased and formal and informal 
ties between the banks and the states were weakened via, changes in HFSF 
governance and corporate governance reforms.   
To summarize, while in the first phases of the crisis bank–state ties were considered 
to be a useful crisis management tool, under the Syriza-led movement, the banks’ 
political susceptibility was seen as an obstacle to attracting private capital at a time 
when banks were thirsty for it.34 The links between the state and the banks had to be 
weakened this time in order to safeguard financial stability. In this sense, it can be 
concluded that, beyond the creation of the EBU, it was mainly that foreign investors 
lacked trust in Syriza led government that pushed for far-reaching corporate 
governance reforms and for breaking “formal and informal ties” between the Greek 
banking sector and the state. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Focusing on the Greek institutional context, the paper analysed the dynamics 
surrounding the breaking of bank-state ties in an extreme case and under crisis 
conditions. Namely, in Greece formal and informal relationships between political 
and banking elites were traditionally present, while at the same time the pressure 
for transformation coming from international lenders was expected to be quite high. 
Yet, the analysis provided a more nuanced narrative. In the first two EAPs business 
autonomy was preserved, the state had shares with no voting rights and the “formal 
ties” between the banks and the state were broken. At the same time, there were no 
substantial measures in the first two EAPs to evaluate and restructure the governing 
boards of Greek banks- preserving in that way the informal links between the 
banking and political elites. The most important changes to the management of the 
Greek banks came at the beginning of the third EAP, through the HFSF review of the 
boards and committees of the four systemic banks, with newly established and strict 
criteria.  
The article argues that the delayed breaking of bank-state ties in Greece should be 
attributed to the latter’s use as a crisis-management tool. In particular, the 
government’s ties with the management of the systemic banks facilitated a relatively 
efficient handling of a crisis, which was the most severe in the Euro-area and in the 
country’s recent history. Greece managed to respond to the crisis and to the threat 
 
34 Interview 5 
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of a systemic collapse of the banking sector, thanks to a close network between 
state and its banks. At the same time, international lenders benefitted indirectly 
from these informal links, hence turning a “blind eye”. Given the high risk of 
contagion these links limited the financial risk within the country’s borders.  
Of course, the downside of this phenomenon is that the overlap between private 
and public spheres prevents a pluralistic debate among different actors. More 
specifically, the interests of ordinary citizens are not represented, despite the fact 
that it is taxpayers that undertake the burden of the bailouts (Massoc and Jacob, 
2012). Moreover, the existence of these links is thought to have negatively affected 
the banks’ ability to attract long-term strategic investors and deal with the problem 
of rising NPLs earlier.35   
Lastly, this study demonstrated that the break of bank state ties that came only with 
the third EAP was very radical and was a result of domestic political developments. 
In particular, investors’ and creditors’ lack of trust in the Syriza-led government, led 
to a complete break of bank-state ties. This final break occurred when these links 
were not considered anymore “useful” for crisis management neither at the 
domestic nor in the international level. On the contrary, they constituted an obstacle 
for attracting private capital in the banking sector in a period that it was needed the 
most. Once again, the implications of these measures will be evaluated in the long 
run. If one thinks optimistically, the experience of Eastern European countries with 
the recent crisis demonstrates that the presence of foreign banks and the weakening 
of bank state ties do not lead necessarily to inability to handle the crisis and financial 
instability. On the other hand due to the radical nature of these measures, experts 
with valuable and diversified knowledge of the Greek economy and its different 
sectors will be excluded from the management of the financial sector. In post-
pandemic word, some argue that this can affect the country’s growth strategy.  
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In the occasions that interviewees had moved from the positions they held during 
the crisis to new roles, the list reflects the stakeholder group they belonged at the 
time of the recapitalizations. 
Stakeholder Group: Greek Government  
1. Senior Government Official, 02/02/2020, Athens 
2. Senior Government Official, 11/03/2019, on-line communication 
3. Senior Government Official, 16/03/2020, on-line communication 
4. Senior Government Official, 30/01/2019, Athens 
5. Senior Government Official, 03/02/2020, Athens 
6. Senior Government Official, 05/02/2020, Athens 
 
Stakeholder Group: Greek Systemic Banks and Bank of Greece  
7. Bank senior executive, 04/02/2020, Athens 
8. Bank senior executive, 29/01/2020, Athens 
9. Bank senior executive, 30/01/2020, Athens 
10. Bank senior executive, 06/02/2020, Athens 
11. Bank expert, 30/01/19, Athens 
12. Bank senior executive, 28/11/19, Athens 
13. Bank official, 31/01/2020, Athens 
14. Bank official, 30/01/2020, Athens 
15. Bank official, 29/11/2019, Athens 
16. Bank official, 29/11/2019, Athens 
17. Bank official, 27/11/2020, Athens 
 
Stakeholder Group: Troika 
18. Troika officials-Group interview, 16/06/20 on-line communication 
19. Troika official, 20/03/2020, Telephone interview 
20. Troika official, 06/02/20, Telephone Interview 
 
Stakeholder group: Others 




22. Lawyer, involved in recapitalizations consultant to Greek Government, 
5/02/2020, Athens 
23. Financial sector expert, 7/02/2020, Athens 
24. Lawyer with expertise in banking and finance, 03/02/2020 Athens 
25. HFSF official, 28/01/2020, Athens 
 
Three relevant discussions with researchers from leading UK and Greek Universities 
specializing in Greece helped with their views on the causes and consequences of 
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